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On February 1, 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (Telecom Act or Act).1 After more than a decade of debate
and delay, Congress cut a broad path through much of the regulatory
underbrush surrounding electronic communications in the United
States. An important component of the deregulatory scythe was Con-
gress's repudiation of its 1984 cross-ownership rules,2 which had pro-
hibited local telephone companies from offering cable television or
other video information services to customers in their own service
areas.
Ironically, by the time Congress acted, eight federal courts had al-
ready declared the rules unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment.3 In fact, the Supreme Court had already heard oral argument
on a writ of certiorari from the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of the first
of those cases, Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. United
States.4 After a half-century of extensive, intrusive regulation-with-
out any mention of the First Amendment, even by telephone compa-
nies themselves-local phone companies had finally joined the ranks
of publishers and street corner protesters in the full light of the First
Amendment. After Congress acted and President Clinton signed the
bill into law, however, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
* Professor of Law and Faculty Advisor to the Federal Communications Law Journal, Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington; J.D., Stanford Law School; A.B., Stanford University.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-614 (West Supp. 1996).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 613(b), 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (1984), repealed by Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 124.
3. Southern New Eng. Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 1995); US West v.
United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994); Chesapeake
& Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th
Cir. 1994), and vacated and remanded per curiam for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036
(1996); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL 779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994);
Bellsouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United
States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
4. 830 F. Supp. at 909.
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Court of Appeals to consider whether the legislation rendered the is-
sue moot.
This Article considers the First Amendment rights of telephone
companies, particularly in light of rapid and extensive technological
convergence. Part I examines the history of common carrier regula-
tion in the United States and early administrative steps toward dereg-
ulation. Part II addresses the recent judicial recognition of telephone
companies' First Amendment rights. Part III considers Congress's ef-
forts to deregulate the telephone industry and the Supreme Court's
subsequent refusal to rule on the application of the First Amendment
to telephone companies. Part IV analyzes the significance of tele-
phone companies' First Amendment rights in light of those compa-
nies' significant roles on the information superhighway. The Article
concludes that the status of telephone companies' First Amendment
rights is not moot in the face of the Telecom Act for two important
reasons. First, under Title II of the Communications Act of 19345 and
subsequent legislation, including the most recent bill, telephone com-
panies continue to be subject to substantial federal and state regula-
tion. Much of that regulation directly affects the capacity of telephone
companies to speak. The constitutionality of that regulation will be
significantly affected by a definitive statement from the Supreme
Court concerning telephone companies' First Amendment rights.
Second, in light of the convergence of technologies that make up the
information superhighway, it is no longer reasonable, and certainly
not informative, to speak of the information services and products
provided by telephone companies as constitutionally distinct from
those provided by publishers and broadcasters.
I. REGULATING THE TELEPHONE COMPANIES: THE CONCEPT OF
COMMON CARRIAGE
A. The Telegraph
The first commercially viable form of electronic communication was
the telegraph. Deployed in the United States during the middle part
of the 19th century, the telegraph could reliably send short messages
in Morse code through electrical wires.6 In 1851, there were fifty tele-
graph companies operating in the United States.7 Ten years later, fol-
lowing a series of mergers, the Western Union Company spanned the
5. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614
(1994)).
6. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 25 (1983).
7. JAMES M. HERRING & GERALD C. GROSS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND REG-
ULATION 1 (1936).
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continent. In 1866, Congress, in an effort to encourage expansion of
the telegraph system, offered telegraph companies rights of way along
post roads and across public lands and permitted the companies to cut
trees for poles on public lands without charge.8 In exchange for these
privileges, telegraph companies had to provide service to all would-be
customers without discrimination, the hallmark of common carriage.
By the turn of the century, telegraph companies were routinely
treated by courts as common carriers, analogous to the railroads that
their lines so often ran along,9 rather than as the press or other speak-
ers whose messages their lines carried. 10 As common carriers, tele-
graph companies were subject to significant legislative and judicial
regulation. They were required to serve all who requested carriage,"
provide service for a reasonable price,' 2 obey reasonable regula-
tions,13 and refrain from discriminating among customers14 or other
carriers.' 5 The First Amendment played no role in the evaluation of
these restrictions on telegraph companies.
8. Post Roads Act of 1866, ch. 230, 14 Stat. 221, repealed by Act of July 16, 1947, ch. 256, § 1,
61 Stat. 327.
9. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 10101-11917 (1994)) (regulating railroads as common carriers).
10. See POOL, supra note 6, at 95 ("By 1880 press telegrams were 11 percent of the total
[telegraph traffic].").
11. See State ex rel. Gwynn v. Citizens' Tel. Co., 39 S.E. 257, 263 (S.C. 1901) (finding that once
a carrier had opened its service to the public it could not refuse to supply selected individuals);
Cook v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 46 N.W. 1080, 1082 (Iowa 1890) (stating that a "carrier is
bound by law to carry everything which is brought to him"); State ex rel. Webster v. Nebraska
Tel. Co., 22 N.W. 237, 239 (Neb. 1885) ("[W]hen a person or company undertakes to supply a
demand which is 'affected with a public interest,' it must supply all alike, who are alike situated,
and not discriminate in favor of nor against any."); McDuffee v. Portland & Rochester R.R., 52
N.H. 430, 449 (1873) ("The right to the transportation service of a common carrier is a common
as well as a public right, belonging to every individual as well as to the State.").
12. See Cook, 46 N.W. at 1082 (imposing a duty to carry at "reasonable compensation").
13. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 62 N.W. 506, 510 (Neb. 1895) (analo-
gizing the duties of telegraph companies to railroads and other carriers); Shepard v. Milwaukee
Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 526, 534 (1858) ("The very fact of this exclusive right conferred upon the
company to manufacture and sell gas in the city, to be consumed therein by the citizens thereof,
would imply an obligation on the part of the company to furnish the city and citizens with a
reasonable supply on reasonable terms.").
14. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 619 (1909) ("This lies at the
foundation of the law of common carriers. Whenever one engages in that business, the obliga-
tion of equal service to all arises, and that obligation . . . can be enforced by the courts.");
Scofield v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 3 N.E. 907, 919 (Ohio 1885) ("'The duty to receive and
carry was due to every member of the community, and in an equal measure to each."') (quoting
Messenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 36 N.J.L. 407, 410 (1873)).
15. A telegraph company "represents the public when applying to [another telegraph com-
pany] for service and no discrimination can be made by either against the other, but each must
render to the other the same services it renders to the rest of the community under the same
conditions." People ex rel. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 129 N.E. 220, 222
(N.Y. 1920); see generally Henry H. Perritt Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal
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1. The Communications Act of 1934
Laws governing the telegraph were the obvious model for the tele-
phone when it was invented in 1876.16 The speed with which tele-
phone technology developed and spread is reflected in this fact:
Western Union, then the largest corporation in the United States, re-
fused to purchase the telephone patent in 1876 for $100,000.17 Thirty-
four years later, in 1910, AT&T bought control of Western Union for
$30 million dollars. 18 That same year Congress passed the Mann-El-
kins Act, 19 classifying telephone companies as common carriers and
subjecting them to the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC). Although the ICC was preoccupied with regulating
the railroads, the states and the courts had already imposed an array
of common carrier obligations on telephone companies. 20 In 1934,
Congress passed the Communications Act.21 Title II of the 1934 Act,
which regulates common carriers,22 was taken almost intact from the
Access to Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 73-84 (1992) (discussing common law
legal duties placed upon common carriers).
16. Kenneth A. Cox & William J. Byrnes, The Common Carrier Provisions-A Product of
Evolutionary Development, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934,
25 n.3 (Max D. Paglin ed.. 1989).
17. POOL, supra note 6, at 29.
18. Id. AT&T was forced to divest Western Union in 1913. Id. at 30.
19. Ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910), repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
§ 602(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102.
20. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U.S. 92, 100 (1901) ("As a conse-
quence of [public service], all individuals have equal rights both in respect to service and
charges."); Central Union Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Falley, 19 N.E. 604, 511 (Ind. 1889) (restating
the well established rule that a common carrier may be compelled to render services); State ex
rel. Webster v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 22 N.W. 237, 239 (Neb. 1885) (holding that a telephone com-
pany has a duty to furnish service to all customers without discrimination).
21. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-
614 (1994)).
22. Although it imposes substantial regulations on "common carriers," the Act provides a
meaningless, circular definition of who fits within the term. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1994)
("'Common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmis-
sion of energy.... but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is
so engaged, be deemed a common carrier."). Professor Henry Perritt writes, "Historically, one
of the most important determinants of common carrier status was whether one held oneself out
as a common carrier .... [Tihe justification for the 'holding out' theory was contractual." Per-
ritt, supra note 15, at 77.
Modem case law has developed a series of tests for determining who is a "carrier" and when is
that carrier's business "common." These inquiries, consistent with the traditional "holding out"
theory, focus on the undertakings of the entity. To determine who is a carrier, Professor Perritt
writes, courts focus on three inquires: (1) Does the entity provide services on a "for hire" basis,
i.e., "for the purpose of generating revenue directly"?; (2) Is the entity "primarily engaged in the
business in question"?; and (3) Does the entity conduct the service on a regular basis? Id. at 81-
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Mann-Elkins Act. As with regulation of the telegraph, there was no
mention of the First Amendment; a law designed for regulating the
nation's railroads had been given a new name and applied to the na-
tion's largest communications industry.23
The provisions of Title II impose significant restrictions on the ac-
tivities of common carriers. In addition to a variety of filing and re-
cordkeeping requirements,2 4 Title II obligates "every common carrier
engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to
furnish such communication service upon reasonable request there-
for." 25 It requires that all "charges, practices, classifications, and regu-
lations for and in connection with such communication service ... be
just and reasonable. '2 6 Title II forbids common carriers to "make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any par-
82. To determine what is common, courts ask: (1) Does the entity hold itself out as willing to
serve all who apply?; (2) Does the entity serve the public without discrimination?; (3) Does the
entity perform a service "cloaked with the public interest," i.e., essential to the public in a mo-
nopolistic environment?; and (4) Does the entity have "control over the content of the goods
being transported[?] To be a common carrier, in decisions involving telecommunications carri-
ers, the entity must not control the content of the message." Id. at 82-83.
In the specific context of Title II, the FCC and courts have focused on two factors: "holding
out" the provision of service on a nondiscriminatory basis, and carriage of messages, the content
of which is controlled exclusively by the customer. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.) ("What appears to be essential to the quasi-
public character implicit in the common carrier concept is that the carrier 'undertakes to carry
for all people indifferently ....') (quoting Semon v. Royal tndem. Co., 279 F.2d 737, 739 (5th
Cir. 1960)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976); National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that the "second prerequisite to common carrier
status... is the requirement ... that the system be such that customers 'transmit intelligence of
their own design and choosing'") (quoting Industrial Radiolocation Serv., 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202
(1966)).
23. "Telephone companies" include both local exchange carriers (LECs), which provide local
telephone service and access to long-distance service providers, and interexchange carriers
(IXCs), which provide telephone service between local exchanges. There are approximately
1400 LECs providing service in the United States, most of which are very small. U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, 28-1 (1993). The 22 Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs), the nation's largest LECs, are organized into seven regional holding companies (RHCs)
and provide about 80% of local telephone service. NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO. AD-
MIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NTIA TELECOM 2000: CHARTING THE COURSE FOR A NEW
CENTURY 203 (1988). Interexchange service is dominated by three carriers: AT&T (which con-
trols 63% of the long distance market), MCI (15%), and Sprint (9.5%). U.S. DEPT. OF COM-
MERCE, supra, at 28-7. Telephone customers usually have no choice as to LEC, but are free to
choose among IXCs. Collectively, the telephone companies provide service to more than 88
million households (about 93% of all U.S. households) and 30 million businesses (near 100%).
Id. at 28-1. Local exchange service was expected to generate more than $84 billion and inter-
exchange service almost $62 billion in 1993. Id. at 28-6, 28-7. Including cellular, satellite, and
data services, the entire U.S. telecommunications services industry was predicted to have reve-
nues in 1993 exceeding $184 billion. Id. at 28-1.
24. 47 U.S.C. §§ 219-20 (1994).
25. Id. § 201(a).
26. Id. § 201(b).
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ticular person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular
person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prej-
udice or disadvantage. ' '27 Common carriers must "designate, file with
the Commission and print and keep open for public inspection sched-
ules showing all charges. ' 28 Those charges may not be altered without
giving 120 days notice to the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission). 29 Title II empowers the Commission to hold
public hearings regarding proposed charges,30 prescribe minimum and
maximum charges and "reasonable" classifications of service, 31 and
order payments of damages to third-party complainants. 32 In perhaps
the Act's most extraordinary grant of authority, Section 214 of Title II
forbids any interstate carrier from constructing a new line, extending
or discontinuing an existing line, or providing service over any such
line without a certification from the Commission that "the present or
future public convenience and necessity require or will require" the
new line or service.33
In Federal Communications Commission v. RCA Communications,
Inc. ,34 the Supreme Court interpreted this last provision of Title II to
forbid the FCC from granting authorization for a new telephone ser-
vice without making a specific finding that the new service was neces-
sary.35 This requirement, Pool has written:
[Tiurned the whole set of presumptions under the First Amendment
on its head. Even under the most eviscerated interpretation of the
First Amendment, the presumption is made that anyone can engage
in communicative activities freely, unless there are over-balancing
considerations .... The presumption was exactly the opposite: no
license to communicate was to be issued unless the state in its maj-
esty concluded that such was desirable. 36
In 1994, the Court struck down another effort by the Commission to
reduce regulation of telephone companies. In MCI Telecommunica-
tions Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,37 Justice Scalia
wrote for the majority that the Commission did not have the authority
27. Id. § 202(a).
28. Id. § 203(a).




33. Id. § 214(a) (emphasis added). For an example of a state statute requiring similar ap-
proval for changes in intrastate facilities or services, see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1001 (West
1994).
34. 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
35. Id. at 96-97.
36. POOL, supra note 6, at 104-05.
37. 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994).
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to abandon the requirement of Title II that telecommunications carri-
ers file tariffs with the FCC.38 Neither the majority opinion, nor Jus-
tice Stevens' dissent, mentioned the First Amendment.
In addition to restrictions on creating, expanding, or discontinuing
telephone service and regulations on the operation of a telephone
business, the government has restricted the capacity of telephone
companies to offer information services. In 1970, the FCC determined
that it would not grant telephone companies the certificates required
under Section 214 to offer cable television service in the area where
they provided telephone service. 39 The Commission was concerned
about potential for "unfair or anticompetitive practices" that might
arise from telephone companies owning or controlling cable television
service providers. 40 Under the FCC's ruling, a local telephone com-
pany may lease transmission capacity to an unaffiliated video
programmer, but it may not own, operate, or control such a program-
mer.41 The First Amendment was not addressed by the FCC when it
adopted the rules, nor by the reviewing court in upholding them.42
Congress codified these cross-ownership rules in the Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984.4 3
38. See id. at 2233 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 203(a)).
39. In re Applications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facil-
ities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 325
recons. in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), and affd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449
F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. Id. at 308.
41. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-.58 (1995). The FCC's ruling prohibits a local telephone company from
providing "video programming to the viewing public in its telephone service area, either directly,
or indirectly through an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control
with the telephone common carrier." Id. § 63.54(a). The ruling also prohibits a local telephone
company from providing "channels of communications or pole line conduit space, or other rental
arrangements" to any affiliated companies for the purpose of providing video programming to
the public. Id. § 63.54(b).
42. For an excellent discussion of the First Amendment rights of telephone companies gener-
ally, and a detailed analysis of current restrictions on telephone companies offering information
services, see Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry Into Video Services: A First Amendment
Analysis, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 97 (1991); Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Carriage: Ap-
proaches to Analyzing the First Amendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1071 (1992).
43. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994). The Act states, in pertinent part:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to sub-
chapter II of this chapter, to provide video programming directly to subscribers in its
telephone service area, either directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned by, oper-
ated by, controlled by, or under common control with the common carrier.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in whole or in part to sub-
chapter II of this chapter, to provide channels of communications or pole, line, conduit
space, or other rental arrangements, to any entity which is directly or indirectly owned
by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with such common carrier, if
such facilities or arrangements are to be used for, or in connection with, the provision
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
2. The Modified Final Judgment
Concurrent with the activities of the FCC and Congress, the judici-
ary had also prohibited the largest telephone companies in the United
States from providing electronic information services. A 1956 decree,
which settled an antitrust case against AT&T, forbade the company
from offering any service unrelated to common carriage communica-
tions.44 In 1982, the Modified Final Judgment45 relieved AT&T from
the earlier decree on the condition that it divest itself of its local tele-
phone operations, that it not engage in electronic publishing over its
own long-distance network for seven years, and that the twenty-two
newly created providers of local telephone service not offer electronic
information services "via telecommunications" of any form.
Ironically, it was in Judge Harold Greene's 1982 decree, which up-
held the most extraordinary restrictions on the telephone companies'
ability to speak, that the First Amendment first appeared in a case
dealing with regulation of telephone companies. It was raised not as
an obstacle to restrictions on telephone companies, but rather as an
argument in favor of the restrictions. Citing Associated Press v.
United States,46 a case involving the application of antitrust laws to the
Associated Press, Judge Greene wrote that the "goal of the First
Amendment is to achieve 'the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources.'- 47 Judge Greene anal-
ogized the market for information services with the spectrum used by
over-the-air broadcasting, which the Supreme Court had character-
ized as scarce and therefore justifying upholding regulations that the
First Amendment would prohibit in nonelectronic settings.48 Follow-
of video programming directly to subscribers in the telephone service area of the com-
mon carrier.
Id. § 533(b)(1), (2).
44. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
45. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) modified
and then entered a consent decree that broke up AT&T's monopoly over telephone service in
the United States. Id. at 226. The MFJ created seven Regional Holding Companies and 22 Bell
Operating Companies to provide local telephone service on a regulated, monopoly basis, and left
AT&T free to compete in the long distance market. Id. at 141-42 & n.41; United States v. West-
ern Elec. Co., 569 F.Supp. 1062 n.5 (D.D.C. 1986) (listing the seven RHCs and 22 BOCs). The
MFJ, however, restricted AT&T and the RHCs from entering certain lines of businesses where
the court believed AT&T could unfairly take advantage of its former monopoly powers or that
the RHCs could unfairly take advantage of their new monopoly powers within their geographic
markets. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 178-86 (imposing line of business restrictions on AT&T);
id. at 186-95 (imposing line of business restrictions on the RHCs).
46. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
47. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 183 (quoting Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20).
48. Id. at 184.
1042 [Vol. 45:1035
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ing this analogy, Judge Greene linked the FCC's statutory responsibil-
ity to award licenses to broadcasters with the proposed restrictions on
AT&T's entry into electronic publishing:
Certainly, the Court does not here sit to decide on the allocation of
broadcast licenses. Yet, like the FCC, it is called upon to make ajudgment with respect to the public interest and, like the FCC, it
must make that decision with respect to a regulated industry and a
regulated company. 49
The First Amendment entered Judge Greene's balancing of interests
only once: "In determining whether the proposed decree is in the
public interest, the Court must take into account the decree's effects
on other public policies, such as the First Amendment principle of
diversity in dissemination of information to the American public. '50
Judge Greene's analogy was flawed; the spectrum scarcity that af-
fects broadcasting, even if it exists and warrants a lesser standard of
First Amendment protection, 51 plays no role in telephone service and
the provision of information services by telephone.52 Moreover, the
analogy was misapplied. Even in the context of over-the-air broad-
casting, the Court recognizes the First Amendment rights of broad-
casters. 53 As important as access to a diversity of voices may be, the
Court balances that interest with the rights of broadcasters under the
Constitution to speak without government restraint.54 Judge Greene
erred by considering only the First Amendment interests of the public
and not those of the telephone companies. Finally, Judge Greene
turned a blind eye to the important First Amendment principles iden-
tified by the Supreme Court, such as the application of the First
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 37-40 (1995) (evaluating the spectrum scarcity argument used to justify
a lower standard of First Amendment protection for broadcasters).
52. See Richard A. Hindman, Comment, The Diversity Principle and the MFJ Information
Services Restriction: Applying Time-Worn First Amendment Assumptions to New Technologies,
38 CAT. U. L. REV. 471, 498-505 (1989) (discussing First Amendment implications of the MFJ's
information services prohibition). The author argues that Judge Greene equated "competitive
scarcity"-defined as "the general lack of competitors in an industry or market notwithstanding
entry barriers"-with spectrum scarcity in imposing information restrictions on AT&T and the
BOCs. Id. at 501 & n.217.
53. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378, 380 (1984) ("[T]he First Amendment
must inform and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory power ....
[As a result, government restrictions on broadcasters are constitutional only when the] restric-
tion is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest.").
54. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, for example,
after balancing these rights, the Court concluded: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Id. at 390.
19961 1043
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Amendment to corporations55 and even to regulated utilities,56 and
the constitutional impermissibility of "restrict[ing] the speech of some
... in order to enhance the relative voice of others," a government
purpose that the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo,57 found to be
"wholly foreign to the First Amendment. 58
Judge Greene considered the First Amendment again in his trien-
nial review59 of the Modified Final Judgment.60 After reiterating his
conclusion from three years earlier (that the First Amendment was
relevant to telephone companies offering electronic information serv-
ices only insofar as it supported a prohibition on the practice) Judge
Greene offered a footnote-the first ever in the long history of the
AT&T break-up-on the possible First Amendment interests of the
telephone companies. Judge Greene wrote: "There is no merit to the
contention raised by some that the information services restriction in-
fringes the Regional Companies' own First Amendment rights. 61
Judge Greene offered two single sentence justifications for his conclu-
sion. First, he wrote, "[l]ike all business establishments, those en-
gaged in, or those that, as the Regional Companies here, consider
engaging in, publishing are subject to the antitrust laws."' 62 Of this
there is no doubt. The Court has repeatedly found that laws of gen-
eral application, such as antitrust laws, apply to publishers and others
whose activities are imbued with First Amendment interests.63 This
says nothing, however, about what the First Amendment rights of tel-
55. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
56. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
57. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
58. Id. at 48-49. In Buckley, the Court addressed a broad range of election finance reforms
enacted as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, including a $1,000 limitation on
expenditures by supporters "relative to a clearly identified candidate" for federal office and
limitations on expenditures by candidates themselves. Id. at 7. The Court, in a per curiam opin-
ion, noted from the outset that although the restrictions were content-neutral, they restricted the
ability of some to communicate in order to enhance the capacity of others to express themselves.
Id. at 17, 39. Such discrimination among speakers, the Court held, is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. Id. at 48-49.
59. The MFJ provided for a triennial review of the decree by the district court. United States
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 225 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
60. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987), affd in part and rev'd
in part per curiam, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
61. Id. at 586 n.273 (citation omitted).
62. Id.
63. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("The First Amendment af-
fords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news
and views has any constitutional immunity."); see also Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586 n.273
(citing sources).
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ephone companies may be. Judge Greene's second justification was
that "common carriers are quite properly treated differently for First
Amendment purposes than traditional news media. ' 64 This is also un-
doubtedly true, as evidenced by almost a century of restrictions on
telephone companies without a mention of the First Amendment.
However, Judge Greene's unremarkable observation is somewhat
confused by the fact that he cited for support two cases, both of which
dealt with television, not telephone, service.65 This might suggest that,
as was the case three years earlier, Judge Greene was viewing the tele-
phone market as sharing the same characteristics as the broadcast
spectrum. In any event, this disappointing debut for the First Amend-
ment rights of telephone companies serves to confirm that common
carriers have been accorded no First Amendment protection for their
use of their own transmission capacity.
3. First Steps Toward Deregulation
The seven-year electronic publishing ban on AT&T expired in
1989.66 The information services restriction on the Regional Holding
Companies (RHCs) was lifted by a very reluctant Judge Greene in
1991,67 following a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia that the District Court had applied the wrong stan-
dard in reviewing whether to lift the information services restriction. 68
Judge Greene wrote:
In the opinion of this Court, informed by over twelve years of expe-
rience with evidence in the telecommunications field, the most
probable consequences of such entry by the Regional Companies
into the sensitive information services market will be the elimina-
tion of competition from that market and the concentration of the
sources of information of the American people in just a few domi-
nant, collaborative conglomerates, with the captive local telephone
monopolies as their base. Such a development would be inimical to
the objective of a competitive market, the purposes of the antitrust
laws, and the economic well-being of the American people.69
64. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586 n.273.
65. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (cable television); Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (over-the-air broadcasting).
66. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,673 (granting
AT&T's motion to remove the electronic publishing ban).
67. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 993 F.2d 1572
(D.C. Cir.), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 984 (1993).
68. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 911 (1990).
69. Western Elec., 767 F. Supp. at 326 (footnote omitted).
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Judge Greene did not mention the First Amendment: "The issue sim-
ply did not arise. The telephone was seen as a successor to the tele-
graph; the telegraph in turn was seen as a common carrier like the
railroad; and so that was the law applied. The phone was not seen as a
successor to the printing press."'70
In 1991, the National Telecommunications and Information Admin-
istration, the President's principal telecommunications policy advisor,
concluded that telephone companies "should be permitted to offer
programming in their service areas," subject to appropriate safe-
guards.71 That same year, as part of a five-year proceeding on "video
dialtone," the FCC determined that the cross-ownership ban did not
apply to interexchange carriers. 72 The following year, the FCC recom-
mended to Congress that it "amend the Cable Act to permit the local
telephone companies to provide video programming directly to sub-
scribers in their telephone service areas, subject to appropriate safe-
guards. '73 Although the First Amendment was not in evidence, the
70. POOL, supra note 6, at 103.
71. NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE NTIA
INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION 233 (1991);
see also Comments of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, at 2-3,
In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules (FCC) (CC No. 87-266).
72. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-
63.58, 7 F.C.C.R. 300, 302 (1991) (concluding in the First Report and Order that the telephone-
cable cross-ownership ban does not apply to interexchange carriers); see also National Cable
Television Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying petitions for judicial review).
73. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-
63.58, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781, 5847 (1992) [hereinafter Second Report & Order]. In the Second Report
& Order, the FCC modified its rules to permit LECs to provide video dialtone. Id. at 5783; see
also National Cable Television Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 68 (denying petitions for judicial review). The
Commission in its "Video Dialtone" decision adopted a two-tier approach:
The first tier would be common-carrier based, giving multiple service providers equal,
nondiscriminatory access to the basic functions necessary to connect them to video di-
altone subscribers ....
The second tier would allow telcos to provide some video dialtone services in compe-
tition with other providers. Telcos could provide services such as video gateways, which
allow consumers to access video dialtone services; video processing functions, which
would allow subscribers to store programs or replay portions of programs without a
video cassette recorder; tailored menus, searches or other functions; billing and collec-
tion; order processing; video customer premises equipment; and inside wire
maintenance.
Terry L. Etter & Rick D. Rhodes, Sorting Through the Vision and the Vagueness of the FCC's
Video Dialtone Decision, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 56, 60 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also
Second Report & Order, supra, at 5788, 5806-07, 5810-11. The FCC also redefined the meaning
of "control," which is essential to interpreting § 533(b)'s prohibition on telephone companies
providing video programming through any affiliate "owned by, operated by, or under common
control with the telephone common carrier." Id. at 5819; 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(1) (1994) (repealed
1996). Under the Commission's new interpretation of "control," a telephone company may have
a cognizable interest in a video programmer of up to five percent and go beyond the usual
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Commission concluded that elimination of the ban would "promote
our overarching goals in this proceeding by increasing competition in
the video marketplace, spurring the investment necessary to deploy an
advanced infrastructure, and increasing the diversity of services made
available to the public."'74 As part of the FCC's proceeding, the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice, which had originally sup-
ported the ban, recommended that local phone companies be
permitted "to own and directly provide video programming. '75 The
Department of Justice argued that "because the benefits of allowing
the LECs [local exchange carriers] to provide video programming out-
weigh the anticompetitive risks involved they should be allowed to
enter this market" and recommended "lifting the telephone company-
cable television cross-ownership prohibition contained in the Cable
Act."' 76 Congress toyed with the idea of repealing the cross-ownership
ban throughout the first half of the 1990s, but nonetheless failed to
act.
7 7
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES
As a result, the telephone companies turned to the courts for relief
under the First Amendment. In August 1993, two subsidiaries of Bell
Atlantic Corp. challenged the constitutionality of the ban in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.78 Judge Thomas
Selby Ellis III, wasted little time in recognizing the First Amendment
implications of the ban:
[T]he provision in question must be subjected to a higher standard
than mere "rationality review." Section 533(b) directly abridges the
plaintiffs' right to express ideas by means of a particular, and signifi-
cant, mode of communication-video programming .... As such, a
statute that directly abridges the right to engage in this form of
speech must be evaluated under the heightened standards that have
evolved under the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions.
"carrier-user relationship" with video dialtone customers. Second Report & Order, at 5789,
5793-99, 5801-02.
74. Second Report & Order, supra note 73, at 5847.
75. Reply Comments of the United States Department of Justice, at 44, In re Telephone Com-
pany-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-63.58 (FCC) (CC No. 87-266).
76. Id. at 46-47.
77. H.R. 1504, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2546,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 2800, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 1068, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); H.R. 2437, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
78. Chesapeake & Potomac.Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd,
42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), and vacated and remanded per curiam for consideration of mootness,
116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996). The challenge put the Department of Justice in the position of having to
defend the validity of a provision that it, and the NTIA, had recommended abolishing. See id. at
914 n.8 (noting the agencies' support for repeal of the provision).
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This is true even when the abridgment is an incidental effect of a
statute directed at non-speech activity, such as "structural" eco-
nomic regulation, if such a statute disproportionately impacts enti-
ties engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment. 79
The cases the government cited in opposition were the same as
those relied upon by Judge Greene in his 1982 decree80 and the first
triennial review.81 As Judge Ellis noted, those cases were inapplica-
ble, because all but one dealt with broadcast media and therefore pre-
mised on scarcity of electromagnetic spectrum, a feature that is not
present in telephony.82 Judge Ellis also rejected application of an eco-
nomic scarcity argument:
The only scarcity argument that defendants could legitimately ad-
vance to make the broadcasting cases apposite is that the cable tele-
vision industry is a natural monopoly and, therefore, that certain
economic factors conspire to create a condition of scarcity in the
market for cable television analogous to the scarcity imposed on
broadcasting by the physical properties of the electromagnetic spec-
trum. This argument has been foreclosed, however, by the Supreme
Court's decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo....
The clear implication of Tornillo is that the principle that allows an
increased level of government intervention under conditions of
physical scarcity is inapplicable when scarcity results from purely
economic forces.83
The one nonbroadcast case that both Judge Greene and the govern-
ment relied upon was Associated Press, which, Judge Ellis wrote,
"stands only for the proposition, confirmed in numerous other deci-
sions, that the media may be subjected to economic regulations that
are generally applicable to all industries without triggering heightened
review of such regulations under the First Amendment." 84 The cross-
ownership ban, however, "is not a generally applicable statute" and it
"achieves its aim by means of a direct abridgment of the telephone
companies' right to participate in a protected form of speech. '8 5 As-
sociated Press is therefore not relevant.
Judge Ellis made equally quick work of the government's claim that
telephone companies waived their First Amendment rights in ex-
change for "a government-sanctioned monopoly for the provision of
79. Id. at 918 (citations omitted).
80. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Western Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 183-84
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
81. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987), affd in part and rev'd
in part, per curiam, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir.), and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
82. Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 918.
83. Id. at 919 (citation omitted).




local wireline telephone exchange services."'8 6 The argument failed on
both factual and legal grounds. The plaintiff's monopoly over local
telephone service was granted by the Commonwealth of Virginia; the
cross-ownership ban was imposed by the federal government. "[T]he
sovereign which purportedly provided the benefit to the plaintiffs is
not the same sovereign that placed the condition on the benefit. 87
Moreover, the state-sanctioned monopoly was granted long before the
federal condition was imposed.88 "In no way is there a quid pro quo
relationship between § 533(b) and the local exchange monopoly."8 9
More importantly, the grant of monopoly powers or other benefits
by the government has never been found sufficient to justify abridging
the recipient's First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court rejected
such arguments in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission90 and Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Commission.91 As the Supreme Court wrote in Perry v. Sinderman:92
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit
for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-espe-
cially, his interest in freedom of speech. 93
As a result, Judge Ellis rejected the government's arguments to the
contrary in Chesapeake & Potomac.
Having determined that the telephone company's First Amendment
rights were implicated by the cross-ownership ban, Judge Ellis consid-
ered whether to apply strict or intermediate scrutiny. He categorized
the ban as "content-based" because "[t]he 1984 Cable Act defines
'video programming' as 'programming provided by, or generally con-
sidered comparable to programming provided by, a television broad-
cast station."' 94 "Despite defendants' protestations to the contrary,
there is simply no way that § 533(b), incorporating as it does the
86. Id. at 919.
87. Id. at 920.
88. Id. at 921.
89. Id.
90. See 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980) ("[Central Hudson's] monopoly position does not alter the
First Amendment's protection for its commercial speech.").
91. See 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.1 (1980) ("Nor does [Consolidated Edison's] status as a privately
owned but government regulated monopoly preclude its assertion of First Amendment rights.").
92. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
93. Id. at 597.
94. Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 923 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 522(19)).
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§ 522(19) definition, can be applied without reference to the content
of the message being conveyed." 95
Despite his conclusion that the restriction was content-based, Judge
Ellis determined that strict scrutiny was not necessary because he in-
terpreted the Supreme Court's recent decisions to require strict scru-
tiny of content-based restrictions only where the government's
purpose is to discriminate on the basis of content.96 He therefore ap-
plied the intermediate scrutiny of Ward v. Rock Against Racism 97 and
United States v. O'Brien98 to determine that while the government's
asserted interest-protecting diversity of ownership of communica-
tions outlets-was substantial, the cross-ownership ban "does not fit
with [the government's] asserted justification." 99 The cross-ownership
ban protects against anticompetitive conduct by telephone companies
in the video programming market, where telephone companies have
no greater market power or incentive to act anticompetitively than
any other programmer or cable operator, not in the video transmission
market, where the potential for cross-subsidization is highest. 100 The
court therefore found the cross-ownership ban to be "facially uncon-
stitutional as a violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free
expression" and enjoined its enforcement. 10 1 Judge Ellis's decision
95. Id.
96. Id. at 924-26 (interpreting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410 (1993)); see Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 615, 622-23 (1991) ("Under the Court's present approach, a regulation will qual-
ify as content discrimination only if the government purpose served by the regulation is related
to the content of the speech.").
97. 491 U.S. at 781. In Ward, the Court reaffirmed that regulations of the time, place, and
manner of expression are constitutional if they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Id. at 797-98. For prior cases in which the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to time, place,
and manner restrictions, see generally Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 298 (1984) (National Park Service regulation permitting camping only in designated
grounds); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-812 (1984)
(municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983) (collective-bargaining agreement provid-
ing differential access to interschool mail system).
98. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court in O'Brien elaborated:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of con-
duct .... [government regulation of that conduct is] sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 376-77.
99. Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 929.
100. Id. at 930.
101. Id. at 932.
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was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1994.102 The
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and heard oral argument in
the case in 1995.103
Other telephone companies did not wait for a final result. Within a
few weeks of Judge Ellis's decision, Ameritech brought two similar
suits, 10 4 followed shortly by GTE, US West and PacificTelecom,
NYNEX, 10 5 BellSouth, Southern New England Telephone Company
(SNET), and Southwestern Bell.10 6 The suit brought by US West and
Pacific Telecom was decided in June 1994 by the U.S. District Court in
Seattle.10 7 Judge Barbara J. Rothstein found that heightened scrutiny
was necessary because the cross-ownership ban "directly abridges the
plaintiffs' right to express themselves by prohibiting them from engag-
ing in video programming,"1 08 but that it was not necessary to deter-
mine the precise level of heightened review because the ban failed
even intermediate scrutiny.10 9 Following the same reasoning used by
the Eastern District of Virginia, Judge Rothstein concluded:
The complete ban on telephone company participation in the pro-
vision of video programming in their service areas is an unnecessa-
rily severe means of achieving the government's objectives. In fact,
based on the evidence submitted, it appears that §553(b) does not
actually serve the interests it allegedly advances, and if it does serve
those objectives, it does so in a manner that sacrifices the First
Amendment rights of plaintiffs.110
Her opinion was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in 1994.111
BellSouth's case was decided in September 1994,112 Ameritech's
two suits were consolidated and decided in October,113 NYNEX's suit
102. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
103. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995), vacated and
remanded per curiam for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
104. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, No. 93-C-6642 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 1993); Ameritech
Corp. v. United States, No. 93-CV-74617-DT (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 1993).
105. NYNEX Corp. v. FCC, 153 F.R.D. 1 (D. Me. 1994) (granting New England Cable Televi-
sion Association's motion to intervene of right).
106. Frank W. Lloyd & Peter Kimm, The Cable/Telco Cross-Ownership Issue, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
15, 1994, at 5; Bell Atlantic Leads Charge to Remove Cable Cross-Ownership Ban, TELCO Bus.
REP., Jan. 17, 1994.
107. US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash.), afj'd, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th
Cir. 1994).
108. Id. at 1190.
109. Id. at 1191.
110. Id. at 1193.
111. US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994).
112. Bellsouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
113. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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was decided in December,114 and SNET's suit was decided in April
1995.115 All of the suits were decided on similar grounds: The cross-
ownership ban "directly abridges the plaintiffs' right to express them-





A. The Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation
Act of 1996
On February 1, 1996, Congress finally acted to repeal the 1984
cross-ownership ban,117 to terminate the FCC's video dialtone regula-
tions,' 18 and to exempt LECs from having to obtain a Section 214 cer-
tificate in order to provide video services to their own subscribers.11 9
Under a new part added to Title VI of 47 U.S.C., "Cable Communica-
tions," LECs that provide video services within their own service ar-
eas will be subject to the existing regulation otherwise applicable to
those services.120 The Act, however, imposes stringent prohibitions
on investments in, and operations with, existing cable systems. No
LEC or any of its affiliates may acquire, directly or indirectly, more
than a ten percent financial interest, or any management interest, in
any cable operator providing service within the LEC's telephone ser-
vice area.12 1 Conversely, no cable operator or affiliate may acquire,
directly or indirectly, more than a ten percent financial interest, or any
management interest, in any LEC providing service within the cable
operator's franchise area.122 Moreover, LECs and cable operators
whose service and franchise areas overlap are prohibited from joint
ventures to provide video programming or telecommunications serv-
114. NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL 779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994).
On November 1, 1993, Ameritech filed an action against the United States in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, No. 93-CV-74617-DT (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1,
1993). Subsequently, on June 14, 1994, the action was transferred to the Northern District of
Illinois, where it was consolidated with a similar action filed there. See Ameritech Corp. v.
United States, 868 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. I11. 1994) (describing the procedural history of the
action).
115. Southern New Eng. Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 1995).
116. US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (W.D. Wash.), affd, 48 F.3d 1092
(9th Cir. 1994).
117. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994), repealed by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, § 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 124.
118. 47 U.S.C.A. § 302(b)(3).
119. Id. § 302(a).
120. 47 U.S.C.A § 651(a). Local exchange carriers providing video programming to subscrib-
ers are subject to Title III if by radio communication, Title tt if on a common carrier basis, and
Title VI if by any other transmission technology. Id. § 651(a)(1)-(2).
121. Id. § 652(a).
122. Id. § 652(b).
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ices within their respective service areas. 123 There are some limited
exceptions to these prohibitions, including those for rural systems and
for smaller cable systems that are not owned or controlled by the top
fifty cable systems and that compete in non-top twenty-five markets
with larger cable systems that are owned or controlled by one of the
ten largest cable systems.124 The FCC may also waive the new cross-
ownership and joint venture prohibitions under limited conditions. 125
Finally, the Act directs the FCC to promulgate regulations that ex-
empt LECs that offer video programming to their customers, through
what the Act designates "open video systems," from certain regula-
tory burdens.126 The Act does not define "open video systems," but
they appear to include those services encompassed by the FCC's video
dialtone proceeding. 27 LECs offering open video systems to their
customers are subject to substantial common carrier-like obligations,
including among others: nondiscrimination requirements, regulation
of rates, terms and conditions of service, and a prohibition on select-
ing the video programming services for carriage on more than one-
third of available channels where the demand for channels exceeds
the supply.128 LECs providing open video systems are also subject to
a number of regulations previously applicable to cable television sys-
tems, such as sports exclusivity, network nonduplication, and syndi-
cated exclusivity regulations. 129
Neither the deregulatory provisions-repeal of the 1984 cross-own-
ership ban, termination of the FCC's video dialtone regulations, and
the exemption from Section 214 certification requirements for video
services-nor the new regulatory provisions contain any reference to
the First Amendment rights of telephone companies. The Conference
Committee report speaks only of "encourag[ing] investment in new
technologies" and "maximiz[ing] consumer choice.' 130 As has been
the case for more than a century, the First Amendment played no
apparent role in federal regulation or deregulation of communications
common carriers.
123. Id. § 652(c).
124. Id. § 652(d)(1)-(5).
125. Id. § 652(d)(6).
126. Id. §§ 651(a)(3)-(4), (b), 653.
127. See Respondent's Brief, Response to Suggestion of Mootness, United States v. Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996) (Nos. 94-1893, 94-1900).
128. 47 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(1).
129. Id. § 653(b)(1)(D).




B. The Mootness Argument
As a result of the Telecom Act, the Supreme Court, which on De-
cember 6, 1995 heard oral arguments in Chesapeake & Potomac, re-
manded the case to the Fourth Circuit for a determination of whether
it was moot.131 Solicitor General Drew Days III argued on the gov-
ernment's behalf that because the Telecom Act repealed Section
533(b), the plaintiff's challenge-which sought a declaration of the
section's unconstitutionality and an injunction against its enforcement,
but no damages or other relief based on its past enforcement-was
now moot.132 In their response, attorneys for C&P Telephone dis-
agreed strenuously, arguing that the Act's new regulations and the six-
month delay between the Act's adoption and the FCC's promulgation
of regulations governing open video systems "does not moot a contro-
versy concerning the continuing ban on speech over an open video
system," precisely the sort of service at issue in C&P's case.133
A ban on the provision of video programming to subscribers,
whatever its scope or duration, cannot survive even intermediate
scrutiny (let alone strict scrutiny), because its focus on the editorial
function as such assures that it cannot meet the requirement that it
be narrowly tailored to an important government interest.' 34
"Far from mooting the controversy," C&P's counsel wrote, "the Act
perpetuates the controversy."' 135
IV. THE FUTURE OF TELEPHONE COMPANIES' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Why is determining the First Amendment rights of telephone com-
pany to provide video programming significant? After all, even if the
Supreme Court does not ultimately decide the constitutional issues in
Chesapeake & Potomac, there is no suggestion that common carriers
have no First Amendment rights. A telephone company is as free as
any other company to express itself through media other than its own
transmission capacity.' 36 It can buy advertising space on billboards, in
131. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
132. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Suggestion of Mootness, United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996) (Nos. 94-1893, 94-1900).
133. Respondent's Brief at 4, Chesapeake & Potomac (Nos. 94-1893, 94-1900).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 919 n.19
(E.D. Va. 1993) ("Section 533(b) only prohibits plaintiffs from directly providing video program-
ming to their subscribers. Plantiffs are not prohibited from producing their own video program-
ming and marketing it to broadcasters or cable operators for transmission by means other than
the plaintiff's own facilities."), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), and vacated and remanded per
curiam for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
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newspapers and magazines, and on television and radio. Such com-
munications receive the same level of First Amendment protection as
any other speakers. Common carriage is not a First Amendment void.
Expression by telephone receives constitutional protection just like
expression through any other medium. 137
Telephone companies also receive substantial benefits as part of
their common carrier status. In many cases, they are protected abso-
lutely from competition by local or state franchise agreements. 138 In
all cases, they receive some protection from competition through the
requirements of Section 214; whereas would-be providers of new,
competing services must justify that there is an unmet need that "dic-
tates" the new service. 139 Common carriers often act with govern-
ment-like authority to cross privately owned land, to dig up public
streets, and to string cable along public rights of way. Because they
have little or no ability or authority to control the content of the
messages they carry, common carriers are usually immune from liabil-
ity from the harmful effects of those messages.' 4
0
In light of these realities-that the First Amendment protects both
the right of telephone companies to speak elsewhere and the speech
of others transmitted by the telephone company, and that benefits at-
tend common carrier regulation-what really rests on the failure of
the Court to identify and protect telephone companies' First Amend-
ment rights to provide video and other information services via their
own lines and switches? The resolution of those rights is important
both for telephone companies in their own right, and because of the
convergence of technologies-including those of modern telephony-
that make up the information superhighway.
137. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc., v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-131 (1989) (holding un-
constitutional a statute banning all dial-a-por messages).
138. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 742.5, 854, 1001, 7902.5 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 364.33, .335, .337, .345 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); 220 ILCS 5/13-401, 403-06
(Smith-Hurd 1993); VA. CODE § 56-265.4:4(A) (Michie 1995).
139. See Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 774 (1974). In rejecting the FCC's issuance
of a § 214 certificate to RCA to offer leased-line voice service via Comsat in competition with
Hawaiian Telephone Company, the Court found that "the FCC has not conformed to the re-
quirement that it find the public convenience and necessity dictate the new service." Id. at 774
(emphasis added).
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 612 (1977) (setting forth the privilege afforded
public utilities who accept and transmit defamatory messages); see also Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Lesesne, 182 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1950) (stating that because of the duty imposed on tele-
graph companies to transmit messages for all who request the service, "it is only when the com-
pany has knowledge or reason to know that the messages are not privileged that it becomes
liable for libelous matter contained therein"); O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539,
543 (1st Cir. 1940) (holding that a telegraph company could be held liable for the transmission of
a defamatory message only if its transmitting agent knew that the message was defamatory).
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A. Continued Regulation of Telephone Companies
Whether it is carrying its own expression or that of others, or
whether it is providing basic telephone transmission or an enhanced
electronic information service, the telephone company is engaging in
activities that, but for the history of common carrier regulation, would
be entitled to First Amendment protection. The application of First
Amendment principles from the nonelectronic context would not pro-
hibit all regulation of telephone companies; it would, however, frame
the analysis so that policy makers and courts considered not only the
objectives of the regulations, but also the vital purposes served by the
First Amendment.
Telephone companies and would-be competitors continue to be
subject to regulations affecting their ability to offer expressive serv-
ices. The Telecom Act itself is the source of additional regulation.
Much of the panoply of common carrier regulation continues to re-
strict phone companies. The application of the First Amendment to
these regulations, although not specifically at issue in the Chesapeake
& Potomac case before the Supreme Court, would certainly be af-
fected by the Court's interpretation of the constitutional rights appli-
cable to telephone companies' provision of video services. Recall that
Judge Ellis, after concluding that the First Amendment applied to the
telephone companies' challenge to the cross-ownership rules, used in-
termediate scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of those rules. 141
Judge Rothstein, however, concluded that strict scrutiny was the ap-
propriate standard of review, although she found that the rules failed
constitutional review even under intermediate scrutiny.142 A Supreme
Court decision would provide necessary guidance to future regulators,
litigants, and lower courts about the application of the First Amend-
ment to other regulations applicable to telephone companies.
B. A Constitutional Response to Technological Convergence
Telephone companies do not operate in a technological or market
vacuum. Increasingly, the expressive activities of phone companies
are intrinsically linked with the technologies of publishing, broadcast-
ing, and particularly electronic information networks, and the expres-
sion of the people who use those media. Yet the Court's technology-
141. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 926 (E.D. Va. 1993),
affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded per curiam for consideration of moot-
ness, 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
142. US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184, 1193 (W.D. Wash.), affd, 48 F.3d 1092
(9th Cir. 1994).
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focused approach to analyzing First Amendment rights treats these
media differently.
1. Technological Dependency of the First Amendment
Beginning with its earliest free expression cases, the Supreme Court
has found that First Amendment protection depended upon the me-
dium of communication involved. Where traditional media, such as
newspapers, books, and pickets were involved, the Court has inter-
preted the First Amendment to prevent the government from restrict-
ing expression prior to its utterance or publication, or merely because
the government disagrees with the sentiment expressed. 143 Under the
Court's interpretation, the First Amendment also forbids the govern-
ment from making impermissible distinctions based on content 144 or
compelling speech or granting access to the expressive capacity of an-
other 145 without demonstrating that the abridgment is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling governmental interest. These First
Amendment principles restrict not merely Congress, but all federal
and state governmental agencies. 146 Moreover, these principles may
also apply to expression that the Court has determined does not inde-
pendently warrant protection, 147 conduct that involves no speech, 148
and activities ancillary to expression. 149
143. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (invalidating statute pro-
scribing expressive conduct that was based on the city's disapproval of the ideas expressed); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (vacating injunction
enjoining the New York Times from publishing a classified Government study); see generally
Cate, supra note 51, at 10-11 (discussing the principle against prior restraints).
144. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393 (cross burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406
(1989) (flag burning); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980)
(nuclear power); see generally Cate, supra note 51, at 11-12 (discussing the principle against
content discrimination).
145. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943); see generally Cate, supra note 51, at 12-14 (discussing the principle against compelled
speech).
146. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952).
147. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986); Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964); see generally Cate, supra note 51, at 14-16 (discussing the principle of broad application
of the First Amendment).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 404 (1989); see generally Cate, supra note 51, at 16 (discussing expressive conduct and sym-
bolic expression).
149. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 583-85 (1983); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 19 (1976); see generally Cate, supra note 51, at 16-18 (discussing funding and distributing
expression and several procedural protections for free expression).
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However, when the government sought to impose similar restric-
tions on newer media, such as sound trucks, telephones, or broadcast
television, the Court has assumed that "differences in the characteris-
tics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them.' u5 0 The Court first suggested that First Amendment
protection was technology-dependent in Kovacs v. Cooper,151 a case
involving a New Jersey statute that forbade the use of a "loud and
raucous" sound truck. Justice Jackson wrote in support of the ordi-
nance's constitutionality:
I do not agree that, if we sustain regulations or prohibitions of
sound trucks, they must therefore be valid if applied to other meth-
ods of "communication of ideas." The moving picture screen, the
radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street
corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers.
Each, in my view, is a law unto itself .... 152
Nowhere was this made clearer than in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. Federal Communications Commission.153 There, Justice White
wrote for a unanimous Court that "differences in the characteristics of
new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards ap-
plied to them."'1 54 In Red Lion, he identified the scarcity of radio fre-
quencies as justifying restraints on licensees. 55 At issue was an FCC
rule permitting persons attacked by broadcasts to be notified of the
attack and given an opportunity to respond.' 56 As a result of scarcity,
the Court found that broadcasters-unlike publishers-owe a duty to
the public to provide them with "suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences."'1 57 Rather than oc-
cupy the spectrum for their own expressive purposes, broadcasters are
to serve the interests of the public as identified by the FCC and en-
forced by the courts. Like other trustees, broadcasters can be re-
strained from, or compelled to, action to serve the interest of their
trust beneficiaries. "It does not violate the First Amendment to treat
licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as prox-
150. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969). In Red Lion, the Court
held that the special characteristics of the broadcast spectrum justified lower First Amendment
protection. Id. at 400-01.
151. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
152. Id. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
153. 395 U.S. at 367.
154. Id. at 386.
155. Id. at 388-89.
156. Id. at 378.
157. Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
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ies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and atten-
tion to matters of great public concern."' 158
Only five years after Red Lion was decided, the Court unanimously
struck down a far more limited intrusion into the First Amendment
rights of newspaper publishers. The interests of the public in a com-
petitive and responsible press in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo'59 could not justify "[c]ompelling editors or publishers to pub-
lish that which "reason' tells them should not be published.' "160 In
Red Lion, similar interests were used by the unanimous Court to jus-
tify obliterating the independent First Amendment interests of broad-
casters. The only difference between the two cases was the medium
involved. This focus on the distinctiveness of the medium has been
the Court's consistent approach to First Amendment cases in elec-
tronic contexts ever since: The First Amendment means something
different depending upon the technologies involved.'61
158. Id. at 394.
159. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
160. Id. at 256 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945).
161. The Court explained:
In light of these fundamental technological differences between broadcast and cable
transmission, application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion
and the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First Amendment validity
of cable regulation ....
This is not to say that the unique physical characteristics of cable transmission should
be ignored when determining the constitutionality of regulations affecting cable speech.
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994) (citation omitted); City of
Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) ("In assessing First Amendment claims concerning cable access, the Court must determine
whether the characteristics of cable television make it sufficiently analogous to another medium
to warrant application of an already existing standard or whether those characteristics require a
new analysis."); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) ("[W]e have recog-
nized that 'differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amend-
ment standards applied to them.' ") (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386); Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 818 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court
recognizes that each medium for communicating ideas and information presents its own particu-
lar problems. Our analysis of the First Amendment concerns implicated by a given medium
must therefore be sensitive to these particular problems and characteristics."); Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975) ("[Tjhe 'unique characteristics' of this form of communica-
tion 'make it especially subject to regulation in the public interest."') (quoting Capitol
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972));
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each medium of expression
... must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may
present its own problems."); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 387 (1973) (referring to the "peculiar characteristics of the electronic media"); see
generally Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Super-
highway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062 (1994) (describing the hierarchy of protections accorded vari-
ous technologies).
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This technologically-determinant approach to the First Amendment
yielded no First Amendment protection for telephone companies until
the six district and two appellate court cases striking down the cross-
ownership ban.162 We have yet to hear from the Supreme Court. In
the nonelectronic context, the Supreme Court has applied the First
Amendment to invalidate prohibitions on expression without a li-
cense, such as that required by Section 214.163 "Any system of prior
restraints on expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity." 164 The Court struck down laws
requiring one speaker to subsidize the expression of others or mandat-
ing access to the speaking capacity of another:165 "[B]urdening the
speech of one party in order to enhance the speech of another [is one
government objective] that the First Amendment disallows. ' 166 The
Court has repeatedly held that even if a regulation targets expression
that is "commercial," 167 false and defamatory, 168 uttered by a regu-
lated utility, 69 or even does not target expression at all, but rather
some action necessary to effective communication,' 70 First Amend-
ment interests are implicated. It is irrational to treat speech in one
medium different than in another.
2. Convergence
First Amendment interests are implicated more than ever, and the
irrationality of technology-dependent interpretations of the First
162. See cases cited supra note 3.
163. See, e.g., Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 325 (1958) (striking down ordinance re-
quiring a permit to solicit membership in any organization); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147, 153-54 (1939) (invalidating several ordinances prohibiting entirely or requiring police ap-
proval before handbills could be distributed in public); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450-51 (1938) (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature without first
obtaining permission from the city manager).
164. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
165. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986); Miami
Herald Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
166. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring).
167. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
168. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
169. See, e.g., Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 1; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
170. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 591 (1983) (invalidating special use tax on ink and paper products targeting a small group of
newspapers); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e think
that the First Amendment rights of students may be directly and sharply implicated by the re-
moval of books from the shelves of a school library."); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
452 (1938) (holding that freedom of the press applies not only to publication, but also to its
distribution).
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Amendment clearer than ever, by the convergence now dominating
all communications media. The majority of communication in the
United States today crosses the boundaries that once separated teleg-
raphy, telephony, and broadcasting from each other and from print.
Written words are composed on word processors, stored in computer
memories, transmitted via local networks, telephone lines, and satel-
lites, and then preserved on paper through printers and facsimiles.
Images and sounds are captured by cameras, scanners, microphones,
and other sensors, stored on tape or disc, broadcast over the air or
through coaxial cables or optical fibers, displayed on television or
computer screens, heard on radio, or printed on paper. Data and
voice signals are collected by telephones, computers, and remote sen-
sors, and transmitted via pairs of copper wires, optical fibers, and
satellites, or beamed through the air. Documents are printed, photo-
copied, facsimiled, scanned, and increasingly stored electronically.
3. Digital Information Networks
Nowhere is this convergence more clear, and the status of the First
Amendment more critical, than in digital information networks.
These networks are perhaps the single most influential innovation of
the 20th century. Whether joining the computers in a single office or
spanning the globe, these networks have rapidly become a dominant
force in business, government, education, and recreation in the United
States and throughout the world. The International Telecommunica-
tion Union predicts that by the turn of the century information serv-
ices and products-already the world's largest economic sector' 71-
will account for $3.5 trillion in revenue. 172
The Internet-the most ubiquitous of information networks-con-
nects more than 45,000 separate networks and 37 million users in 161
countries. 173 As of January 1996, there were 9.4 million advertised
hosts, representing an annual growth rate of 85%. 174 There are 76,000
advertised World Wide Web hosts-offering the sites to which the ma-
jority of people who have used the Internet in the past three months
171. NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO. ADMIN. FACT SHEET, May 30, 1995, at 2.
172. Ted Bunker, Is it 1984?, LAN MAG., Aug. 1994, at 40, 42.
173. Latest Estimates of Internet Growth, ONLNE NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1994; Win Treese, The
Internet Index, Jan. 2, 1996, available on the Internet at http://www.openmarket.com/index/96-
01.html; Host Distribution by Top-Level Domain Name, Internet Domain Survey, Jan. 1996,
available on the Internet at http://www.nw.com/zonefWWW/dist-byname.html.
174. Number of Hosts, Domains, and Nets, Internet Domain Survey, Jan. 1996, available on
the Internet at http://www.nw.com/zone/WWW/report.html; see also Anthony M. Rurkowski, In-
ternet Trends, Feb. 1996, available on the Internet at http://www.genmagic.com/internet/trends/
sld003.html (charting the number of Internet hosts from 1989 to 1996).
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report having connected-and that figure represents an annual growth
rate of 2,400%.175
Telephone companies already provide one of the most essential
components of both the Internet and many other networks: the local
user's connection-the so-called on-ramp to the information highway.
Phone companies also, of course, offer Web pages and participate in
on-line discussions. In the future, these companies are likely to play
an even more significant role as providers of valuable network serv-
ices, local access with greatly expanded bandwidth and intelligent
services, and backbone transmission capacity. The current and future
roles of telephone companies have caused concern among many legal
scholars and others about the public's right of access to networks. As
a result, they have called for continued and expanded common carrier
regulation.176
As important as access is, the failure to identify and protect tele-
phone companies' First Amendment rights will contribute even more
in the future to confusion over the First Amendment status of expres-
sion on the Internet and other digital networks. As other provisions
of the Telecom Act make clear, digital information networks are criti-
cal new battlegrounds for First Amendment freedoms. As was the
case with telegraphy, telephony, and broadcasting, neither Congress
nor the Administration seems overly concerned about the role of the
First Amendment in cyberspace. This is surprising, given the breadth
of issues addressed in the Clinton Administration's Agenda for Ac-
tion177 and the variety of committees, working groups, and subwork-
ing groups that are part of the Administration's Information
175. Domain Survey Observations, Internet Domain Survey, Jan. 1996, available on the In-
ternet at http://www.nw.com/zone/WWW/observations.html; Treese, supra note 173.
176. See, e.g., Allen S. Hammond, Regulating the Multi-Media Chimera: Electronic Speech
Rights in the United States, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 85 (1995) ("The First
Amendment is better served when network owners, providers, and users retain access and
speech rights."); Allen S. Hammond, Private Networks, Public Speech: Constitutional Dimen-
sions of Access to Private Networks, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1085 (1994) (describing policies and
regulatory strategies government should adopt in response to the convergence and increased
privatization of telecommunications networks in order to ensure access and speech rights for
everyone); James N. Horwood, Public, Educational, and Governmental Access on Cable Televi-
sion: A Model to Assure Reasonable Access to the Information Superhighway for All People in
Fulfillment of the First Amendment Guarantee of Free Speech, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1413
(1995) (advocating application of the PEG-(public, educational and governmental) access model
to the Information Superhighway); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First
Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1737-39
(1995) (suggesting that a common carrier approach to the Internet may best assure that all
speakers receive nondiscriminatory access).
177. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
STRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION 5 (1993).
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Infrastructure Task Force. 178 Yet the First Amendment isn't men-
tioned in the Agenda for Action nor in any of the Administration's
pronouncements concerning the National Information Infrastructure
(NII). Nor does the First Amendment appear in speeches by Vice
President Gore, Secretary Brown, or other senior administration
officials. 179
This omission of the First Amendment from information policy is
even more significant in light of the substantial regulatory role the
administration anticipates that the government should play in imple-
menting that policy. On December 21, 1993, Vice President Gore de-
livered the Administration's first major policy address on the NII at
the National Press Club in Washington. In his speech, the Vice Presi-
dent, the intellectual and political force behind the Administration's
NII initiative, analogized the current information marketplace to the
environment that, in his view, permitted the sinking of the Titanic.
The Vice President argued that the Titanic's radio operators did not
receive the warnings about icebergs in the vicinity and so few ships
responded to the Titanic's distress signals, because "the wireless busi-
ness then was just that, a business. Operators had no obligation to
remain on duty. They were to do what was profitable. When the
day's work was done-often the lucrative transmissions from wealthy
passengers-operators shut off their sets and went to sleep.' 180 Just
as that tragedy "resulted in the first efforts to regulate the airwaves,"
the Vice President urged, so do the many issues posed by the NII re-
quire the government to "get involved" to protect "public needs that
outweigh private interests."'1 81 The First Amendment was not
mentioned.
The Vice President's vision of the proper role of the government's
information policy, judging from the Titanic example, is to regulate
178. President Clinton created the Information Infrastructure Task Force on September 15,
1994, chaired by then-Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown. Id. at 7. The Task Force is charged
with articulating and implementing the administration's vision for the National Information In-
frastructure (Nil). Id. at 19. The Task Force is divided into three committees: the Telecommuni-
cations Policy Committee, the Information Policy Committee, and the Applications and
Technology Committee. Id. at 19-20. These committees are subdivided into working groups
and, in some cases, even subworking groups, reflecting the breadth of issues that the Task Force
is addressing. Id. at 20. For further discussion and critique of the Clinton Administration's in-
formation policymaking, and call for a more comprehensive and balanced approach to informa-
tion policymaking that includes critical First Amendment concerns, see Fred H. Cate, The
National Information Infrastructure: Policymaking and Policymakers, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
43 (1994).





the NII by restraining those "private interests" that unspecified "pub-
lic needs" outweigh. 182 Such restraints, however, pose constitutional
issues when the private interests-whether of a telephone company,
another business, or an individual-are engaged in providing informa-
tion services and products. The complete absence of the First Amend-
ment from the policy making debate exacerbates these issues because
it suggests that the government has ignored, rather than identified and
resolved, them.
The protection of expression in this new, electronic medium will fall
to the Supreme Court, as it has in the past. The Court's fascination
with the technological aspects of media of communication and its will-
ingness to condition fundamental First Amendment freedoms on
those aspects, raises the specter that it may fail to extend the full pro-
tection of the First Amendment not only to the expression of tele-
phone companies, but also to expression on the Internet-a medium
that for the first time since the invention of the printing press gives
real meaning to the concept of a "marketplace of ideas."
V. CONCLUSION
Despite an historically broad interpretation of the First Amend-
ment to provide significant protection to a wide range of communica-
tion and expressive activity, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
assumed that technological differences among media involved may
justify diminished application of the First Amendment. In the case of
telephone companies-the largest, farthest reaching communications
medium in the world-there has been a longstanding, historical as-
sumption that the First Amendment did not apply to those companies'
own expressive activities via their own networks.
In Chesapeake & Potomac, two federal courts reversed that assump-
tion and found that the First Amendment prohibits government re-
strictions on video expression by telephone companies. Although
passage of the Telecom Act repeals the specific provision at issue in
Chesapeake & Potomac, the legislation does not eliminate all restric-
tions on such video expression-in fact, it creates new ones-nor does
it affect a wide range of other restrictions on the expressive capacity of
telephone companies. As a result, the issues on writ of certiorari
before the United States Supreme Court are neither moot in a legal
sense, nor irrelevant. The constitutionality of those restrictions and of
future regulations will be significantly affected by a definitive state-
ment from the Supreme Court concerning telephone companies' First
182. Id.
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Amendment rights. Moreover, in light of the convergence of informa-
tion technologies, it is no longer reasonable to speak of the informa-
tion services and products provided by telephone companies as
constitutionally distinct from those provided by publishers and broad-
casters. Chesapeake & Potomac offered the Court a long overdue
opportunity to bring its constitutional analysis in line with technologi-
cal convergence and to bring the process of examining increasingly
overlapping media under one First Amendment standard that protects
the speech marketplace and the rights of all who use it.

